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Integrative Vs Distributive Bargaining 




This paper examines the antithetical nature oftwo methods 
of resolving conflict through negotiation, and suggests there is 
an appropriate process depending upon how a party views the 
problem, and how he perceives it being viewed by his opponent. 
Labour management relationships encompass both conflict and 
coopération. The former condition is rooted in the necessity of dividing 
finite resources, and the latter recognizes the symbiotic nature of the rela-
tionship1. Presumably the processes the parties choose to résolve problems 
that inevitably arise reflect the bifurcated nature of their relationship. 
However, the considérable académie interest in the processes used by the 
parties to cope with their problems usually présupposes either an approach 
based on coopération, or one based on conflict. It does not seem possible 
that either a coopérative or conflict-based approach is always appropriate in 
every labour-management relationship. A complète considération of the 
problem resolution process should, therefore, contain an analysis of a 
primary step. This step is the choice of the type of process to be used for 
resolving a problem when it first arises. 
* FRASER, C.R.P., Faculty of Commerce and Business Administration, The Universi-
ty of British Columbia. 
COLEMAN, Rick, Faculty of Commerce and Business Administration, The Universi-
ty of British Columbia. 
** The authors are respectively Staff Représentative of the British Columbia Govern-
ment Employées Union and Assistant Professor, University of British Columbia. The paper is 
based on the former author's Master's Thesis. 
1 HILLS, Steven, "Organizational Behavior and Theoretical Models of Industrial Rela-
tions", Proceedings of the Twenty-Eighth Annual Winter Meeting, 1975, Madison, Wiscon-
sin, Industrial Relations Research Association, 1976. 
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This paper is a theoretical examination of the way in which parties can 
reach apparently effective problem solutions from the perspective of an in-
itial choice of a process. For given situations, décision rules are formulated 
which suggest the appropriate course of action. In particular, the discussion 
focuses on the possible effect of spécifie stratégies which are necessitated by 
choosing a particular process. Finally, the unique one-problem case is 
generalized to considération of more than one problem. 
AVAILABLE PROCESSES 
There are four options open when a problem first arises. One party 
may rely on the other to develop a solution and accept this solution ar-
bitrarily. Second, one party may présent its own solution as the only alter-
native, choosing to terminate the relationship should that solution not be 
acceptable to the other. Third, the party may negotiate a solution, attemp-
ting to dérive as much partisan satisfaction as possible regardless of the loss 
to the other party as long as the relationship is prolonged. Fourth, the party 
may join with the other in attempting to résolve the problem with the major 
criterion being the overall quality of the solution (maximizing joint benefits) 
rather than the comparative level of benefits. 
In an industrial relations perspective which assumes a continuing rela-
tionship, the first two processes need not be considered. The first option can 
be rejected because it lacks credibility in an interest-laden industrial society. 
The second can be dismissed because it lacks the dependence implicit in this 
symbiotic relationship. We are, therefore, left with the third and fourth op-
tions, referred to in the literature as "distributive" and "integrative" 
respectively2. 
The integrative option represents a spécifie procédure designed to op-
timize the probability of both parties obtaining a good and perhaps "best" 
solution to a particular problem. The tactical imperatives3 suggest a suffi-
2 WALTON, R., and R. McKERSIE, A Behavioral Theory of Labour Negotiations, 
New York, McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1965. 
3 The integrative process is ultimately a problem solving exercise which concentrâtes on 
the best total solution to a problem instead of immédiate individual party interests. This is a 
procédure that requires a mutual identification of the problem, a search for alternate solutions, 
and an eventual choice of a solution that will accommodate the interests of both parties. The 
tactical imperatives associated with this procédure are associated with the need for trust and 
mutual coopération in identifying what both parties need and want from an eventual solution. 
They relate specifically to reducing the other party's fear of exploitation and building a strong 
coopérative atmosphère. 
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ciently depersonalized bargaining atmosphère to erase the participants' 
identification with one or the other party, and the establishment of an 
overall, single team spirit. The key requirements are trust and openness. 
The emphasis is on employing ail resources to defeat the problem rather 
than spending a substantial portion on defending one's own partisan posi-
tion. 
The distributive bargaining process4 is the antithesis of the integrative 
option. Essentially, the distributive model assumes that the primary concern 
for each party is deriving a maximum share of a solution or, more ap-
propriately, "seulement". Each party will go to considérable trouble to 
positively effect the balance in its favour, given the nature of the stakes in-
volved. Party Unes are clearly drawn and there is a common realization that 
each party is concerned with obtaining the largest benefit share. The em-
phasis is on calculated maneuvers designed to alter the opposite's viewpoint 
of what is an acceptable share distribution. Unlike the integrative process, 
which seeks to détermine the one best solution to a problem, the distributive 
process represents a method by which each party attempts to obtain the 
. solution that it believes would maximize its own interests, fully realizing it is 
a win/lose situation. Solutions are sought and graded against partisan utili-
ty functions on an independent basis. The emphasis is on forcing a par-
ticular solution rather than discovering one. 
DECISION MODEL 
Thus, there are two antithetical processes through which problems can 
be resolved. The choice of one process over the other is based on (i) the par-
ty's expectations concerning the potential outcomes of a problem, and (ii) 
its perceptions of the opponent's expectations concerning that outcome. 
A party's expectations concerning the possible outcomes of a problem 
can be seen as being based on the perceived total utility of the outcome. To 
the degree that a problem is seen as one where the outcome potential is fix-
ed, a trade-off exists where an increase in utility to one is a decrease to the 
other. However, the problem can also be seen to hâve a potential gain to 
4 The distributive process represents a method by which each party attempts to obtain 
the solution that it believes would be best for partisan interests, fully realizing that it is a 
win/lose situation. It is a dynamic process based on calculated maneuvers designed to alter the 
opposite's viewpoint on what is an acceptable share distribution. Solutions are sought out and 
graded against partisan utility curves on an independent basis. 
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both parties. Thèse two possible expectations combined with the two 
available processes for dealing with the issue indicate four possible décision 
situations. Thèse are illustrated graphically in Figure 1. 
FIGURE 1 





However, it is not sufficient to consider just one party; there is an in-
teraction of two which must be considered. An individual will consider not 
only his own expectations, but his perception of those of the other party as 
well5. 
The necessity of a party estimating its opposite's expectations of the 
problem situation has been documented by a number of researchers, par-
ticularly those concerned with conflict bargaining6. Ail were concerned with 
stratégies of distributive bargaining, and each indicated that effective 
bargaining nécessitâtes an estimate of probable response. If a party is to 
sélect an appropriate strategy with regard to the utility functions of the 
other party, accurate assessment of their position is necessary. Otherwise a 
party*s own position will suffer on two counts. 
5 For simplicity "perception" will refer to assessments by one party of the other's ex-
pectations concerning the potential outcomes and "conception" will refer to one's own expec-
tations concerning the outcomes. 
6 STEVENS, Cari, Strategy and Collective Bargaining Negotiations, New York. 
McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1963; Edward PETERS, Strategy and Tactics in Labour Negotia-
tions, New London 1955; Ann DOUGLAS, Industrial Peacemaking, New York. Columbia 
University Press, 1962; WALTON and McKERSIE, op. cit. 
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First, incorrect assessment will lead to inappropriate offensive bargain-
ing behavior. An underestimate by party A of the level of benefit share that 
party B is striving for, for example, may lead party A to a commitment to a 
level which is really quite unacceptable to party B. This mistake could lead 
to a breakdown in negotiations and to open conflict such as a strike. 
Similarly, concession or commitment tactics based on such an overestimate 
will cause party B to reassess his own bargaining position. An example of 
such a mistake is provided by Douglas7. 
Protection of one's own "real" position is as critical as accurately 
assessing the other party's position. In this context, inaccurate perceptions 
which lead to inappropriate information dispersement will cause the op-
posite party to act inappropriately. A party who reveals too much may ac-
tually alter the whole bargaining situation from one conducive to quick 
agreement to one which will drag on for days, and perhaps break down8. 
Siegal and Fouraker9 provide expérimental support for the argument 
that an incorrect défensive strategy can lead to increased offensive tactics by 
the other party. In early experiments of bargaining behavior they observed 
that an unexpectedly generous bid by one party led to an increased level of 
aspiration in the opponent rather than a quick settlement. Incorrect défen-
sive strategy can be compared to the openness of an integrative strategy. 
Thèse arguments may be used to support the contention that the initial 
choice of a process must be a function of a party's own conceptions 
together with an estimate of the opponent's conceptions. A party will not 
blindly enter a bargaining situation hoping that the other party perceives 
similar circumstances. A party facing a décision over one of two processes is 
in the same predicament. If the process turns out to be distributive they will 
want to be prepared. Consequently, that party will try to estimate the op-
posite's conception of the same problem before initiating or participating in 
a particular process option. 
Given that there are two possible expectations concerning the potential 
outcome of a problem, and there are two possible processes to résolve that 
problem, there are a variety of possible circumstances in which the parties 
may find themselves. 
Thèse combinations are illustrated in Table 1. For each of the parties, 
there is represented (a) their conception of the possible outcome (columns II 
7 DOUGLAS, op. cit., pp. 280, 281. 
8 See, for example, DOUGLAS, p. 36. 
9 SEIGAL, S., and L. FOURAKER, Bargaining and Group Décision Making: Ex-
periments in Bilatéral Monopoly, New York, McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1960. 
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and VI respectively) and (b) their perceptions of the other's position (col-
umns III and V). For each unique set of circumstances there is an ap-
propriate process to be followed. This is indicated in Column VIII of Table 
1, and each is based on two gênerai rules for which considérable support can 
be found in the literature. Referring to the décision paths from Figure 1: 
(I) If a party A identifies a problem as having integrative potential 
but is not sure of the response of the other party, décision " b " 
(distributive process) will be pursued over décision "a" (in-
tegrative process). 
(II) Décision "d" (identifying a problem as distributive and pursu-
ing an integrative solution) is never made. 
Rule I suggests that mutual perceptions of integrative potential and pro-
bable integrative response (Table 1, case 1) are the only circumstances where 
an integrative process would be chosen. Rule II indicates that an integrative 
choice in the case when one perceives a distributive potential and expects a 
distributive response (Table 1, case 10) would be irrational. Both décision 
rules suggest that one party's désire for an integrative option is insufficient 
incentive for an integrative process to be pursued. 
TABLE 1 
Process Décisions 
/ II III 
PARTYA 




Estimate Perception Décision Perception Estimate Décision Expecte< 
Case of of Path of of Path Process 
# Problem1 Party B (Figure 1) Party A Problem (Figure 1) 
D I1 I a I I a I 
2) I I a D I b I o r D 
3) I I a I D c D 
4) I I a D D c D 
5) I D b D I b I o r D 
6) I D b I D c D 
7) I D b D D c D 
8) D I c I D c D 
9) D I c D D c D 
10) D D c D D c D 
î I refers to expectations of integrative potential; D refers to expectations of distributive 
potential. 
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Thèse rules are based on the behavior considered to be appropriate for 
particular sets of perceptions. The discussion of their validity is based on (i) 
the optimum use of différent initial tactics employed for each of the process 
options; (ii) game theory experiments concerning trust and suspicion; and 
(iii) spécifie aspects of North American industrial relations. 
TACTICAL DIFFERENCES 
The tactical maneuvers required for success in each process are entirely 
différent. The integrative process calls for the identification and candid 
considération of a number of alternate solutions together with a search for 
new solutions through a combination of mutually attractive features10. The 
distributive process on the other hand, works on a limited number of solu-
tions generated separately by each party as its optimum solution11. The in-
tegrative process is exploratory and tentative, as opposed to the fïrm com-
mitments of the distributive process12. The commitments necessary for suc-
cess in the latter13 are disfunctional in the former14. Overall, the open at-
mosphère of objectivity, trust, and low pressure implicit in the integrative 
process is inconsistent with the calculated high pressure, low trust tactics of 
the distributive process. 
The first steps of each process are consistent with the gênerai com-
parison. In the integrative process, the first step calls for a maximum shar-
ing of information in the form of basic objective facts. This is necessary if 
the solution is to adequately deal with each party's needs. The initial stages 
of the distributive process serve the same function of information flow, but 
the first step of the distributive process calls for a minimum sharing of cor-
rect information and the appropriate médium is tentative solutions (the in-
famous "demand"). The distributive strategy is to force the opponent into 
revealing his real position (minimum acceptable level) while presenting a 
much inflated version of one's own position. 
Neither party will be affected by the distributive/integrative tactical 
divergence if both parties recognize an integrative potential and perceive a 
io MINER, J., The Management Process-Theory, Research and Practice, New York, 
Macmillan Co., 1973. 
il STEVENS, op. cit. 
12 WA L TON and McKERSIE, op. cit. 
13 STEVENS, op. cit. 
u HINTON, Brian, "Environmental Frustration and Creative Problem Solving", Jour-
nal of Applied Psychology, Vol. 52, 1968, pp. 211-217. 
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forthcoming integrative response. But if one party blindly pursues an in-
tegrative process and the other side is intent on the distributive process, the 
information sharing will be one sided and the first party will be at a distinct 
disadvantage, having revealed its preferred position. Each party should 
recognize this situation, or fail to recognize it only once. Depending on the 
party's degree of risk avoidance, it could either wait for the other party to 
show its hand or pursue the safer route regardless (Rule 1). 
A perception of distributive potential and distributive response will 
never be handled in an integrative manner because this would invite ex-
ploitation (Rule II). However, in the situation of integrative potential, 
distributive response (Rule 1) there is an added variable. The degree of cer-
tainty that the other party will respond in a distributive manner to an in-
tegrative initiative is a function of party A's trust in party B. 
TRUST AND SUSPICION 
The effect of trust, and its counterpart, suspicion, on collective 
bargaining has attracted a great deal of académie considération. Anecdotal 
évidence15 however, need not be relied upon because the topic has generated 
a great number of controlled laboratory experiments. 
In particular a number of game theorists hâve attempted to analyze col-
lective bargaining through the sélective manipulation of trust in artificial 
bargaining environments. Deutch, for example, defined trust as choosing to 
pursue a path that may lead to an event perceived to be harmful, even 
though occurrence of this event is dépendent on another person and there 
are definite indications that the potential loss may be greater than the poten-
tial gain16. Trust, therefore, becomes synonymous with confidence. 
In terms of the probability of coopération between parties, given at 
least one trusting party, "... the choice (between cooperating or not) is 
determined by such variables as the relative attractiveness of the competing 
alternatives and the subjective probabilities of realizing the alternatives"17. 
Severe problems of trust, therefore, occur when one or both parties are "... 
indirectly oriented to obtain maximum gain at minimum cost (to 
themselves)"18. Such is the case in distributive bargaining. 
15 DOUGLAS, op. cit., p. 72. 
16 DEUTCH, M., "The Effect of Motivational Orientation Upon Trust and Suspicion", 
Human Relations, Vol. 13, 1960, pp. 113-139. 
n Ibid., p. 125. 
is Ibid., p. 123. 
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Deutch was primarily concerned with the effect of individually perceiv-
ed intentions on trusting behavior. He used a two-person, potentially 
variable-sum game in which individual rewards were dépendent on choices 
made by both parties. The game was structured such that décisions based on 
individual rationality were impossible unless conditions of mutual trust also 
existed. Subjects were programmed to a coopérative, compétitive, or in-
dividualistic motivational orientation and experiments were conducted con-
trolling for simultaneity of choice and pre-choice communication variables. 
The cases of most interest to the collective bargaining sphère are those in 
which non-simultaneous choice was paired with an individualistic orienta-
tion. The latter is closest to the "integrative" orientation given above 
because only the compétitive motivational orientation carried the implica-
tion of win/lose conflict. The coopérative orientation was much stronger 
than the integrative requirements given above. The indication from this 
work is that Deutch's subjects were risk averters when faced with an in-
tergrative/distributive décision and uncertainty of an opposite's reciprocal 
action. 
Unfortunately, Deutch's study lacks a certain degree of relevance to in-
dustrial relations because he made no attempt to control for the negotiating 
history of relationships. However, there is another study which did control 
for this variable. Benton, Gelber, Kelly, and Liebley19 conducted a card 
game simulation where both parties were rewarded a certain amount per 
trial depending upon the succeeding state of a card variable. The critical 
aspect of the expérimental design was that only one player had cost-free 
knowledge of the card variable, whereas the other party could only obtain 
direct knowledge at a penalty cost to both. As in labour-management 
negotiations, both players were faced with dilemmas of honesty versus 
deceit and trust versus suspicion. The controlled variable was "trustwor-
thiness', as measured by the first subject's (perfect information) history of 
deceit. The authors found that the rate of doubting, even in the face of 
négative conséquences, increased markedly according to the controlled sub-
ject's untrustworthy behavior. 
The implication for the présent study is that distrust, and a ,;<b" déci-
sion path, is a function of past bargaining behavior. By the very nature of 
the distributive process (controlled information flow, misinformation, etc.) 
Benton et al's findings suggest that any perceptions of a distributive 
19 BENTON, Alan, E. GELBER, H. KELLY, B. LIEBLEY, "Reactions and Various 
Degrees of Deceit in a Mixed-Motive Relationship", Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, Vol. 12, 1968, pp. 170-180. 
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response based on past expérience should be sufficient motivation to pursue 
an initial distributive strategy. 
Loomis20 was even more pessimistic regarding the potential for an in-
tegrative process. In the theoretical introduction to his paper, Loomis sug-
gests that there are four conditions essential for the establishment of a rela-
tionship based on trust, ail of which are only satisfied in case 1 of Table 1: 
(1) Each individual must be committed to reaching some goal where 
commitment is such that failure to achieve the goal would cost 
more than he would be willing to risk in an uncertain venture. 
(2) Each individual must realize that he cannot reach a spécifie goal 
without the help of other persons. 
(3) Each individual must recognize a similar dependence of the 
other person(s) to him and that they are ready to help him. 
(4) Each individual must know that the other parties are each aware 
that the members are ail mutually interdependent. 
By Loomis' estimation, the crucial factor is a state of "perceived 
mutual trust". He discounts any possibility of anything but a case 1, Table 
1 situation leading to an integrative process:21 
... If the individual perceives mutual trust, he will cooperate, and if the 
individual does not perceive mutual trust he will not cooperate. In the 
second case the individual should see (équivalent to Table 1, cases 5, 6, 
7, 10 for party A; cases 2, 4, 5, 7, 9, 10 for party B) since he has no 
reason to expect that the person will cooperate, that an uncooperative 
choice is his best défense against undue loss. 
A paper written by Shure, Meeker, and Hansford22 is more specifically 
focused on the first move of a tactical interchange. The task in this experi-
ment was such that coopération was possible, thereby maximizing total 
gain, together with two other behavior combinations: dominance/ submis-
sion and mutual interférence. If both parties remained leary of each other's 
motives, mutual interférence would isolate individual players thereby per-
mitting little or no reward, but also no direct "punishment". If one party 
decided to trust the other, however, severe vulnerability was experienced 
due to an aspect of the game design that gave the opposite party the power 
to dominate future behavior if the first party chose to initiate an inter-
20 L O O M I S , J . , "Communica t ion , the Development of Trust and Coopérat ive 
Behavior" , Human Relations, Vol. 12, 1959, pp . 305-317. 
21 Ibid. , p . 308. 
22 S H U R E , G. , R. M E E K E R , and E. H A N S F O R D , " T h e Effectiveness of Pacifist 
Stratégies in Bargaining G a m e s " , Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 9, 1975, p p . 106-117. 
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change with an integrative move. Domination ranged from allowing the op-
posite party to maximize his total possible gain to the infliction of physical 
pain (an electric shock). 
In this experiment there was no bargaining history to bias the subjects' 
décisions. Actions were based solely on each subject's culturally acquired 
feelings for a situation where they could gain a reward, but only through ex-
trême vulnerability. Such a cost was too much for over one half on the sub-
jects to even contemplate coopération in the form of an integrative process. 
This suggests a high probability that a "safe" distributive option will be 
pursued in ail cases where response is unsure, even when a party recognizes 
a potential for coopération. 
Thèse controlled experiments indicate that any party facing a high 
threat situation will tend to react in a safe manner. There are a number of 
aspects of the labour-management sphère which make this conclusion even 
more valid. 
Aspects of North American Industrial Relations 
THE PRESENCE OF AUDIENCES 
An audience is defined as a physical or psychological présence for 
whom the negotiator must perform. The motivation to perform rests on the 
need for peer support for psychological well-being and career goals. In most 
cases, the audience is somehow dépendent upon the negotiator's perfor-
mance for either tangible (as in monetary value of a benefit share) or in-
tangible outcomes (emotional feelings of victory or defeat). Much concern 
is therefore directed towards the negotiator's behavior by himself, his 
fellow negotiator's, and his constituency. A positive or négative audience 
response may be directed at any aspect of the negotiator's behavior or the 
conséquences of this behavior: spécifie commitments, concessions, 
agreements, bargaining style, etc. 
Some literature is devoted to analyzing this aspect of the labour-
management interchange, particularly the dominance of a constituency on 
the labour side. Blum23 writes that audiences are the sole reason for the pré-
sent form of collective bargaining. He suggests that the negotiators are 
23 BLUM, A., "Ritual versus Reality in Collective Bargaining", Harvard Business 
Review, December, 1961. 
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aware of what the level of seulement will be from the start, but ap-
pearancesof hard fought battles are necessary to sustain constituency sup-
port. 
A cursory treatment of the subject is provided by Rubin and Brown24. 
Thèse authors hâve stated a number of gênerai propositions. The most rele-
vant to présent purposes is one which states:25 
If a bargainer is accountable to an audience for whatever it is that will 
bring positive évaluation, then this accountability is the mechanism by 
which he may be controlled. 
Rubin and Brown suggest that constituencies hâve the power to apply 
sanctions to negotiators who are perceived to be behaving inappropriately. 
Sanctions include removal of the negotiator from his rôle, reduced support 
(wildcat strikes, etc.) and damage to his bargaining réputation. Empirical 
support for this proposition is provided by McKersie, Perry, and Walton26. 
Observing the 1961 Auto Workers/International Harvester contract 
negotiations, thèse authors " . . . found that a negotiator's failure to bargain 
in accord with his constituency's préférences had serious implications for 
his continuation as a member of the bargaining team"27. Further, " . . . a 
good number of delegates perceived high costs in failing to advocate their 
constituents' demands. Many of the delegates faced serious challenges to 
their leadership from organized factions within the membership and could 
be said to hâve chosen their orientation in response to implicit political 
sanctions"28. 
On a similar plane, Rubin and Brown pose a second proposition:29 
Audiences, especially dépendent ones, generate pressures toward loyal-
ty, commitment, and advocacy of their preferred positions. 
In support of their proposition the authors cite a number of expérimen-
tal studies which demonstrate the conformity of negotiators to group 
norms. 
24 R U B I N , F . , and R. B R O W N , The Social Psychology of Bargaining and Negotiations, 
New York, Académie Press , 1975. 
25 Ibid. , p . 47. 
26 M c K E R S I E , R., C . P E R R Y , and R. W A L T O N , " In t rao rgan iza t iona l Bargaining in 
Labour Nego t i a t i ons" , Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 9, 1965, p p . 463-481. 
27 RUBIN and B R O W N , op. cit., p . 48 . 
28 McKERSIE et a l . , op. cit., p . 465. 
29 R U B I N and B R O W N , op. cit., p . 50. 
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The relevance of the "audience effect" for présent purposes relates to 
the potential willingness of a negotiator to act cooperatively in front of a 
distributively oriented constituency. Constituents are often not aware of the 
intricacies of negotiations30. They see only the broader picture which in 
North America usually delineate an "us/ them" relationship. If there is 
some doubt of an expected integrative response in the negotiator's mind, 
there may be a great deal of doubt in the less informed constituent. Labour 
relations literature contains a number of outstanding examples of the au-
dience phenomenon. 
In 1965, four and one-half years of peaceful (no strikes or breakdowns 
in negotiations) negotiating in the steel industry was terminated with the 
unseating of the union leadership. Apparently, three décades of severe strife 
(e.g. long strikes, vicious diatribes) and bitter win/lose bargaining prior to 
1960 had created militancy in the rank and file. The latter distrusted 
management's intent and believed that their leaders were being tricked into 
subservience to management's desires31. 
On the same plane a period of accrimonious and costly bargaining bet-
ween the Amalgamated Méat Cutters and Retail Food Store Employées 
Union and a supermarket employers' association was followed by a brief 
period of more integrative behavior. No emotional shouting matches were 
permitted and no accusations were allowed during a party's présentation. 
But because " . . . the new bargaining approach did not follow the traditional 
pattern, both sides (constituents) began to question not only the adequacy, 
but the integrity of their spokesmen"32 
BARGAINING POWER IN FUTURE DISTRIBUTIVE NEGOTIATIONS 
In the opening pages of Industrial Peacemaking, Douglas notes that 
when " . . . the negotiators close the doors to the conférence room, they turn 
their backs on reality in any of the sensés in which science and society use 
that term"33. The validity of this statement is demonstrated in the 
distributive model provided above. Except where extrême condition of 
disproportionate power exist, the model implies that negotiation outcomes 
30 B L U M , op. cit. 
31 FELLER, D., "The Steel Expérience: Myth and Reality", Proceedings of the Twenty-
First Annual Winter Meeting, 1968, Madison, Wisconsin, Industrial Relations Research 
Association, 1969. 
32 Business Perspectives, 1968, pp . 4-10. 
33 D O U G L A S , op. cit., p . 8. 
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dépend to a great extent on the skillful use of the available tactics rather 
than on an environmental reality. Part of negotiation skill is providing as 
favourable an image as possible of one's power position. The latter is defin-
ed in the context of inability to resist/ability to insist. The degree to which 
expériences negotiators realize this negatively affects the relevance of a 
"real" power structure. This conclusion is implicit in the nature of the 
distributive process. The présentation of a favourable net expected utility 
function and the attempted manipulation of the other party's net expected 
utility function, particularly through a commitment strategy, indicates the 
prevalence of exaggerated projections. For example, if a party makes a 
threat to strike, this threat will hâve no coercive power unless it is believed 
by the opposite party. 
Each party must therefore be careful not to give its opposite any im-
pression of weakness. In a continuing relationship the necessity of 
demonstrating a favourable image carries over between différent contract 
negotiations. A sign of weakness given in one set of negotiations may 
become relevant when the contract reopens through a deflated image of 
"power" and consequently, perceptions of minimum acceptable levels of 
benefit shares. This effect could lead to unnecessary sanctions or even 
deadlock if the initial préparation of party B's ability to resist/insist is in-
correct. 
In the présent discussion thèse arguments suggest that a party which 
foresees any future distributive bargaining with the same opposite party will 
not jeopardize the potential future value of commitment tactics by 
demonstrating any dependence on the other party for future reward 
distribution. The instigation by party A of an integrative process may be a 
signal to party B that A does not hâve the power to push for what it wants in 
a distributive process, and must rely on party B's coopération in order to at-
tain even the smallest benefit share. 
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
The décision model proposed in this paper makes prédictions of ra-
tional behavior which can be expected in circumstances of particular 
perceptions. Prédictions for each perception/conception combination are 
given in column VIII of Table 1. 
In the first four cases listed, party A is expected to pursue an in-
tegrative process. It will enter the process prepared for a maximum sharing 
of information. In case 1 this plan will be reciprocated, but in cases 2, 3, 
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and 4 party A will soon discover that party B is not prepared to share infor-
mation so freely. Party A will encounter réservation in case 2, but 
distributive agression in cases 3 and 4. In case 2, party A will probably en-
counter a fairly quiet opposite who will be prudently awaiting signs from 
party A that the problem is as party B itself sees it. Any other behavior will 
destroy any likelihood of coopération. 
In case 3, party B may décide to respond to party A's integrative in-
itiative by creating the false impression that it is an integrative problem, 
hoping thereby to trick party A into revealing too much information. There 
is some doubt that this can continue for any length of time because party B 
will not want to reveal any information regarding its own position. This will 
alert party A of its inappropriate choice in case 4, party B will enter pre-
disposed to pursue the distributive process. 
The same arguments apply to party A's choice in cases 5 through 10. 
Party A will either try to fathom the situation or pursue the distributive pro-
cess regardless because of a perception that B has an inclination towards the 
distributive option. The rôles are sometimes reversed; however, it seems 
clear that only in the first case is the integrative process likely to be chosen 
and completed. Even in case 5 where both parties are actually T , the 
distributive process will ultimately prevail because the integrative option 
does not allow for the kind of information exchange where one party gives 
an incrément of information and then waits for the other party to make a 
similar contribution. This is not a trust filled atmosphère and temptations 
and suspicions will arisé concerning how much and what kinds of informa-
tion should be traded. In ail other cases a choice of the integrative option 
would be a tactical error since it would put a party at a severe bargaining 
disadvantage. 
The same logic used for isolated problems can be extended to cases 
where there are two or more. When problems are of différent catégories i.e. 
integrative or distributive potential the antithetical nature of the processes 
will guide the choice of a process. If the two processes are attempted at the 
same time or even in the same relationship, one or the other process must 
suffer some altération. Either the distributive process must become un-
characteristically open or the integrative process will be debased by 
calculated information restriction. Degrees of variation in information flow 
and coopérative, non-partisan discussions are as critical to the integrative 
process as calculated restriction of information is to the distributive pro-
cess. The latter can continue as such with a varying amount of disclosure, 
but the integrative process cannot continue to operate with any partisan 
restriction of information flow. Such restriction will foster distrust and the 
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degree of coopération will decrease for both parties. Therefore integrative 
processes need to be separated from the distributive variety. 
Further, in some cases problems of a similar nature may hâve to be 
separated. By their nature integrative processes should tend toward the 
isolation of particular problems. Indeed, the nature of the integrative 
modePs first task of problem définition implies the necessary singularity of 
problems. Distributive combinations are slightly more complicated. 
Theoretically they could go either way depending upon the party's percep-
tion of which will prove most advantageous. It may be felt, for example, 
that a bargaining advantage will be enjoyed if a problem is considered by 
itself. In gênerai, however, there is a tendency for distributive issues to be 
treated together. This "packaging" occurs because parties do not commit 
themselves to a singular solution to one issue before ail issues are con-
sidered34 but also because two issues provide two sets of information plus 
additional tactics which are generated from the combination. The latter 
refers to a concession process where each party attempts to manipulate the 
other's net utility function for one issue through another35. 
The conclusion to be reached is that normally, a désire for separated 
problem solving will only exist if both parties wish to pursue an integrative 
process. This condition is unlikely unless both parties perceived a potential 
for an integrative solution and a forthcoming integrative response from the 
other party. Given a history of distributive bargaining, such perceptions are 
unlikely. Even where an integrative response is considered likely, success of 
this type of process dépends upon separating this resolution process from 
distributive processes. 
34 Labour Gazette, January, 1975, pp . 40-46. 
35 See, for example, W A L T O N and McKERSIE, op. cit., p . 77. 
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Coopération ou contestation en tant que 
méthode de règlement des différends 
L'examen des deux méthodes pour résoudre les différends permet de constater 
que leurs exigences se contredisent. 
L'approche coopérative ou la négociation interdépendante vise à rechercher le 
meilleur règlement d'un problème. Les stratégies et les tactiques que l'on utilise s'op-
posent à l'idée de conflit ou à l'approche de contestation. Le processus choisi, dans 
une situation donnée, repose en premier lieu sur le fait qu'une partie considère le 
problème en lui-même. En d'autres termes, y a-t-il possibilité d'un avantage qui est 
partagé entre les parties ou existe-t-il une possibilité d'accroître leurs avantages 
mutuels,? 
En deuxième lieu, le choix du processus peut reposer sur la perception qu'une 
des parties se fait du point de vue de son adversaire. En d'autres mots, l'adversaire 
considérera-t-il la question en recourant aux stratégies et aux tactiques d'une ap-
proche de coopération ou d'une approche de contestation? 
Cette double approche, qui repose sur la façon dont on conçoit le problème à 
résoudre et sur l'opinion que l'on a de l'adversaire, peut conduire à la possibilité de 
dix situations différentes. (Tableau 1) (Le cas illogique de n'envisager que la possi-
bilité de contestation mais de choisir l'autre méthode ne peut être considéré comme 
option). Les auteurs estiment que le processus de coopération ne pourra se produire 
avec certitude que là où les deux parties considèrent le problème et l'adversaire com-
me s'ils désiraient coopérer dans la recherche d'une solution. Dans les deux autres 
cas, on peut accepter de suivre un processus de coopération, mais cela dépend de 
l'attitude initiale d'une partie qui considère le problème ou l'autre partie sous l'angle 
de la contestation. 
Les auteurs tirent cette appréciation de trois sources. Ils considèrent d'abord les 
tactiques inhérentes aux deux méthodes pour régler le problème ainsi que l'effet de 
ces tactiques sur l'autre partie. En second lieu, ils ont tenu compte de l'expérience ac-
quise en matière de confiance et de méfiance des deux parties l'une envers l'autre. 
Finalement, ils étudient certains problèmes particuliers dans le domaine de relations 
professionnelles, soit l'influence d'un groupe sur le comportement de ses agents et 
l'effet du pouvoir de marchandage dans des rapports professionnels dynamiques. 
Enfin, les auteurs laissent entendre que l'étude d'un cas unique isolé peut s'ap-
pliquer également à des cas à problèmes multiples. 
